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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE
US-ROC RELATIONS
Y. L. Wu* AND K. C. YEH**
The central question discussed in this paper is the economic
impact of alternative US-ROC relations. As US-PRC relations
develop further, alternative forms of the relations between the US
and the ROC must be considered. Among these broad alternatives
are: (a) continuation of US-ROC relations as they now stand, (b) a
more unambiguous two-China policy on the part of the United
States which will reaffirm the latter's determination to abide by
existing treaties and to maintain its political and economic
relations with the ROC under bilateral agreements at the
government level, whatever may be the relationship between the
United States and the PRC, and (c) downgrading of US-ROC
relations, which can be carried out in varying degrees either
following or simultaneously with the diplomatic recognition of
Peking. We assume for the purpose of this paper that the term
''normalization" is used by most people at present as a code word
for diplomatic recognition of Peking, although the two terms are
not necessarily identical. (Some countries that have maintained
full diplomatic relations with Peking for some time do not seem to
enjoy closer substantive relations with the PRC than does the
United States. It is hard to define precisely what one means by
''normal relations" with Peking.) By "economic impact" we mean
the effect on (a) the economic viability of Taiwan as an
independent economic entity, (b) the present and future economic
interests of the United States, and (c) the economic interests of
such major interested parties as Japan.
We shall attempt, in the first place, to identify the basic
factors, insofar as they are relevant for our purpose, that have
made possible the impressive economic performance of Taiwan,
both in the decade and a half before the 1973 oil crisis and since
that crisis (see Figure 1). Taiwan's past economic performance can
best be illustrated here by a quick reference to (a) the growth of its
GNP and foreign trade, (b) the relative price stability up to the eve
of the oil crisis in spite of Taiwan's rapid economic growth, (c) the
continuous improvement of its balance of payments until the oil
crisis and even in spite of it, and (d) the relatively equitable
* Consultant, Hoover Institution, Stanford University; and Professor and
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** Senior Economist, The Rand Corporation.
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
600
600
400
30
200
100
5.000
4.000
3.000
2.000
1,000
r Real GNP,~.... 
Foreign Trade, Eprs+I~ rSaCurrent~~Whleal Price an hoeadexieInie
1952 19 96 15 0 192 16 96 16 97 92 17 951976
R! 111igure 1
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
distribution of income and economic power among the island's
population.
The United States resumed large-scale economic aid to
Taiwan in 1952. The index of Taiwan's real GNP (at constant
1966 prices) in 1972, the year immediately preceding the oil crisis,
stood at 538.2 (1952 = 100).1 The annual rate of growth during the
two decades averaged 8.8 percent, rising from 7.2 percent a year
during the first decade to 10.4 percent during the second decade.
Alternatively, we can point to the increase in the average annual
growth rate in successive periods from 7.2 percent in 1952-60 to
9.6 percent in 1960-65 and 10.1 percent in 1965-72. The latter
comparison is perhaps more meaningful, for reasons which will
become clear later. The trend was briefly interrupted by the world-
wide recession in 1974, but the economy has moved upward again
since then. While the real growth rate fell to only 0.6 percent in
1974, it returned to 2.0 percent in 1975, and bounced back to over
10 percent in 1976.2 On a per capita basis, Taiwan's GNP growth
rate between 1952 and 1972 averaged 5.6 percent a year in real
terms, far exceeding the corresponding rates of most other
developing countries including the PRC. There can be little doubt
that Taiwan has taken off on a path of sustained economic
growth. The record of 1974-76 testifies further to the resilience of
the economic system in the face of exogenous shocks.
This remarkable growth record was achieved with only
moderate price increases. The average rate of increase of
wholesale prices between 1952 and 1972 was 4.6 percent a year;
that of consumer prices, 5.8 percent. The rate of increase of
wholesale prices slowed considerably from 8.8 percent a year in
1952-60 to 3.4 percent a year in 1960-73; correspondingly, that of
consumer prices fell from 9.7 percent a year in 1952-60 to 4
percent in 1960-73. As a result of the oil crisis, wholesale and
retail prices rose by 35.2 percent and 47.5 percent respectively in
1974. However, the price index was again stabilized after that. It
dropped by 5.1 percent in 1975 for wholesale and rose by 5.2
percent for retail.
After its reform in 1958, the official exchange rate of the New
Taiwan Dollar has not varied significantly from the free market
rate, except for a brief period following the loss of Taiwan's U.N.
1. Council for Economic Cooperation and Development, Taiwan Statistical
Data Book, 1973, Taipei, p. 18.
2. Taiwan Statistical Data Book, 1975. For 1976, see report in the Central
Daily News (Taipei), December 11, 1976.
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membership in 1971 and, to a lesser extent, during the oil crisis in
1973-74. Taiwan's official international reserves were at the level
of about $1.6 billion in October 1976, apart from which additional
holdings of probably about the same amount are available.
From the point of view of social stability, the trend toward
more equitable distribution of income is even more significant.
The Gini coefficient declined continuously from 0.6 in 1953 to 0.30
in 1972.3 The top 20 percent of all households on the income ladder
received 61 percent of total income in Taiwan in 1953; this share
dropped to 39 percent in 1972. The shares of those with lower
incomes increased correspondingly. A comparison of Taiwan's
pattern of income distribution with those of other countries shows
that the lowest 40 percent of its population on the income ladder
had a distinctly larger share of total income than the correspond-
ing segment of populations in most other Asian countries such as
Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and India. In fact, its relative
shares of income by income class were almost identical with those
of Japan and came rather close to those of the United States.
Measured in these terms, income distribution in Taiwan in 1972
was only slightly "less equal" thanthat of Poland in 1964 and
slightly "more equal" than in Yugoslavia in 1968.4
The underlying factors of Taiwan's rapid economic growth
are many and their interrelationships complex. Two, however,
stand out as fundamental and are especially relevant to an
assessment of Taiwan's economic viability in the future; to wit,
the rapid growth of human and material capital stock and the
phenomenal expansion of exports. During the period in question,
the former laid the groundwork for the increase in the economy's
productive capacity while the latter provided the necessary
stimulus for the expansion of aggregate demand. At the initial
stage, that is, during the 1950s, when the economy faced a dual
gap in foreign exchange and domestic savings, massive U.S. aid
played a key role in sustaining a high rate of investment.
Subsequently, domestic savings and foreign investment replaced
U.S. aid as the major source of financing development; foreign
investment also served as a supplement to Taiwan's foreign
3. See, Wan-Yong Kus, "Income Distribution by Size in Taiwan Area -
Changes and Causes," Income Distribution, Employment and Economic Develop-
ment in Southeast and East Asia, The Japan Economic Research Center, Tokyo
and the Council for Asian Manpower Studies, Manila, July 1975, p. 94.
4. Y. L. Wu, Income Distribution in the Process of Economic Growth,
(forthcoming).
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exchange earnings. Finally, although its amount has been small
relative to U.S. aid in the 1950s, foreign investment has been an
indispensable vehicle in export marketing and in the transfer of
technology, two of the principal factors that have made possible
the growth of Taiwan's export-oriented economy and its structural
change.
STAGES OF GROWTH OF TAIWAN'S EXPORTS AND IMPORTS
Since Taiwan is an island with limited natural resources, its
continuous growth and economic viability must be predicated
upon its ability to draw upon available resources in other
countries. The fruits of these overseas resources must in general
be purchased. Accordingly, a priori, the sustained growth of the
economy requires the unimpeded growth of foreign trade and
investment, as well as long-run equilibrium in the balance .of
payments. Furthermore, as long as the domestic market is
relatively small, demand for increasing production must rely
largely upon the export market. Hence our attention should be
focused, in the first place, upon the principal factors underlying
Taiwan's expansion in foreign trade.
A statistical overview of the growth of Taiwan's exports from
1952 to 1973 suggests that this historical development can best be
divided into four distinct periods. (Figure 2 depicts the annual rate
of growth of Taiwan's exports on a year-to-year basis; the index of
any given year is calculated by using the preceding year as 100.)
(a) Continual fluctuations were exhibited during the period before
1959. Increases in exports in some years were followed by declines
in others, and the annual growth rate in value terms varied within
a wide range, from +30 percent to -30 percent. (b) The second
period began in 1959 and ended in 1966. The annual growth rate
of exports in real terms increased steadily through 1964. The
corresponding rate in value terms fluctuated more widely due to
changes in export prices. (An increase of 50 percent in value was
registered in 1962.) During the second part of this period exports
in real terms grew at about 20 percent a year. (c) The third period
began in 1967 and ended in 1973. During this period Taiwan's
exports grew generally at 20 percent or more in quantum each
year. The annual increase in value terms was, of course, at a
faster rate, reaching a peak of 50 percent in 1973 due to a
considerable rise of prices during that year. (d) The fourth period
began in 1974. Because of the sharp increase in crude oil price and
the world-wide recession that ensued, Taiwan's exports declined
144 THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
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by 4.4 percent in real terms in 1974. Recovery began in the latter
part of 1975 and the volume was substantially larger in 1976.
A similar review of the history of Taiwan's imports presents
us with the following picture (Figure 3). (a) Before 1963, the annual
growth rates of Taiwan's imports fluctuated considerably,
although the fluctuations were within a narrower range than
those of pre-1959 exports. The corresponding annual growth rate
of imports in quantum varied from +10 percent to -7 percent in
most years; greater fluctuations were registered in value terms.
However, declines in quantum were reported only in two out of the
eleven years in this period; declines in value were registered only
in three years. (b) The second period began in 1963 and ended in
1973. In value terms, imports rose at above 20 percent a year in
most years during 1963-71 with larger variations in quantum.
Between 1971 and 1973 the rate rose to substantially above 20
percent a year, reflecting price increases, while the rate of increase
in quantum remained at slightly above 15 percent. (c) The third.
stage began in 1974. In that year the value of Taiwan's imports
rose very sharply as a result of the price increases of oil and other
intermediate products, as well as stepped-up purchases in the
preceding year. However, the recession led to a decline of real
imports by 11.2 percent in 1975, followed by a substantial recovery
in 1976.
MAJOR BENCHMARKS IN FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT
The transition of imports from one stage of development to
another lagged behind that of exports, apparently for two reasons.
First, imports fluctuated less than exports before 1963 because of
the availability on substantial imports financed by U.S. aid.
Second, although production and exports could not rise without
increasing imports, the expansion of imports in the later stages
was also an effect of the prior expansion of exports. The
conservative and cautious policy makers who managed Taiwan's
balance of payments apparently made sure that import expansion
would lag slightly behind the growth of exports. They were
apparently anxious to build up the country's foreign exchange
reserves in the light of their experience with balance of payments
deficits over a number of years.
The first benchmark in the expansion of Taiwan's exports
occurred in 1959, midway between 1958 and 1960 when major
foreign exchange reforms were instituted. During these three
years multiple exchange rates were abolished step by step, and the
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differential between the official and free market rates was
successfully narrowed. The premium of the free market rate over
the official rate, which stood at NT$24.78 to one U.S. dollar in
1957, declined from 54.9 percent in that year to only 9.6 percent in
1961. The official rate in 1961 was NT$40.03 to one U.S. dollar
while the free market rate was NT$43.89. Minor fluctuations
occurred during the intervening years between 1961 and 1966,
when the second phase of Taiwan's export development ended.
However, by 1966, the two rates were virtually at par, NT$40.10
being the official rate, and NT$41.00, the free market rate.5 The
removal of multiple exchange rates and the effective devaluation
of the New Taiwan dollar were approached in a very gingerly
manner, and even this cautious approach was not adopted until
the price level had become sufficiently stabilized during the
preceding years. While price inflation was rampant in 1951 and
1952 - wholesale prices rose by 66 percent in 1951 and 23.2
percent in 1952 - the rate of increase had dropped to 7.2 percent
in 1957 and 1.4 percent in 1958 .6 Without this prior development
and the restoration of confidence in a stable currency, the foreign
exchange reforms could not have been instituted; nor would they
have been so successful in promoting exports and in doing away
with the price distortions and inequities the multiple exchange
rates had engendered.
Establishment of the necessary prior conditions for economic
reform was in a very significant measure also a result of U.S. aid.
During 1951-55, U.S. aid amounted to 47 percent of Taiwan's
gross capital formation and 43 percent of total imports; these
ratios fell to 34 percent and 36 percent respectively in 1956-60, and
17 percent and 19 percent respectively in 1961-65. 7 Absence of
either of these two conditions - exchange rate reform and U.S.
aid - would have made a critical difference.
The benchmark separating the second and third stages of
Taiwan's export growth occurred in 1965-66. Having already
liberalized its regulations governing investment by overseas
investors at the time of the earlier exchange reform, Taiwan took
5. These data, originally derived from the Central Bank of China, are given
by Mo-huan Hsing in "Taiwan: Industrialization and Trade Policies," in a volume
entitled The Philippines and Taiwan, Industrialization and Trade Policies,
published for the Development Center of OECD, Oxford University Press, London,
1971, Table A. 23, p. 292.
6. See Neil H. Jacoby, U.S. Aid to Taiwan, A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help
and Development, Praeger, New York, 1966, Appendix C. Table 16, p. 286.
7. Mo-huan Hsing, op. cit., p. 197.
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additional steps in the same direction in January 1965. The first
Export Processing Zone was established at Kaohsiung, and a
sharp increase in direct investments from abroad followed
immediately. The cumulative total of foreign direct investment
approvals rose from $93.1 million at the end of 1964 to $134.7
million a year later.' By 1973 the corresponding total had risen to
$1,287.1 million; it was $1,405.2 million in 1975. The data in Table
1 will provide a historical perspective in capsule form.
Table 1. Foreign Investment Approvals
(U.S. $ million)
Investors All
U.S. Investors from Japan Countries
1952- 59 9.5 1.4 20.2
1960-64 38.0 6.4 72.9
1965-69 126.9 52.7 327.2
1970-74 254.5 132.2 866.7
Source: Sjou-eng Koo, "Foreign Investment and Industrialization in Taiwan,"
Academia Ecomonic Papers, Nankang, Taipei: The Institute of Economics,
Academia Sinica, Vol. 4, No.1, p. 128, March 1976. Original data from the Foreign
Investment Commission.
LIBERALIZATION OF FOREIGN TRADE, EXCHANGE AND
CAPITAL INFLOW: THE DOMESTIC AND
WORLD ENVIRONMENT
The history of Taiwan's foreign trade expansion points
indisputably to the importance of appropriate domestic economic
measures. Exports became profitable as a result of the 1958-60
reform which directed the attention of private business toward
export promotion, away from the hidden subsidy of licensed
imports at artificially low foreign exchange rates. The export
processing zones (EPZs) successfully attracted foreign investors to
Taiwan; not all of them located their plants within the zones.
Encouragement of direct foreign investment in general, both
inside and outside the zones, was undoubtedly instrumental in
solving the very important marketing problem on which export
expansion depended. Once established in Taiwan, the foreign
firms outside the zones also supplied their products to Taiwan's
domestic market where demand was expanding with the very
8. These data are from the Foreign Investment Commission, Ministry of
Economic Affairs, Republic of China.
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economic growth to which export expansion contributed most
decisively. The EPZs apparently served a path-breaking function,
providing this initial attraction to induce foreign investors and
other businessmen to come to Taiwan, and encouraging domestic
firms to locate the items solely to promote exports.
As of March 1977, there were 10 sole U.S. and 68 sole
Japanese-owned firms in the EPZs. In addition, there were 68
joint ventures composed of U.S.-Japanese interests; 4 composed of
U.S.-Japanese and other interests; 9 composed of U.S. and other
interests; and 51 composed of Japanese and other interests. Still
other investors, many from Hong Kong, are also located in EPZs.
Thus many Japanese, Hong Kong and other firms export to the
United States, as well as to other markets, from Taiwan.
An earlier incomplete count shows that as of 1974, 14 U.S.
firms had been established within EPZs.9 In addition, 313
American firms were located outside the zones. Of those outside
the zones 250 firms, or 80 percent, were established after 1965. It
was in 1965 that foreign investment rule§ were further liberalized
and U.S. aid to Taiwan officially came to an end. A more recent
count based on 1976 data shows that there were 63 additional U.S.
firms on the later list that were not on the 1974 list. A number of
these, if not all, must have been established after 1974. All the 63
are located outside the EPZs.
Figure 4 presents a vivid illustration of the rise of Taiwan's
exports and imports in current dollars. However, neither effective
marketing with the aid of foreign investors nor unilateral reform
on the part of Taiwan would have sufficed had not the demand for
Taiwan's exports expanded considerably during this period.
Figure 5 shows that the share of the U.S. market in Taiwan's
exports for the first time surpassed that of Japan during 1966-67.
The shares of the two countries became about equal in 1962.
Before 1962 Japan's share had been consistently higher. However,
the emergence of certain new agricultural exports from Taiwan to
Japan again pushed up Japan's share between 1962 and 1966. The
crossing of the two lines depicting the respective shares of the
United States and Japan as buyers of Taiwan's exports in
1966-67 (Figure 5) signaled the rise of the role of new exports of
manufactures from Taiwan. Their appearance was a direct
outcome of the increase in foreign direct investment.
9. Calculated from directories of U.S. and Japanese firms. The figures are not
all inclusive.
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Between 1966 and 1973 U.S. general imports rose from an
index of 100 to nearly 400 (see Figure 6). During the same period,
Taiwan's exports to the United States rose much more sharply,
from an index of 100 in 1966 to 1377 in 1973. This nearly 14-fold
increase was partly a reflection of the greater competitiveness of
Taiwan products on the U.S. market, but the increase was also
aided by the general expansion of U.S. imports. Furthermore,
Taiwan's exports to the United States had been so small that the
large increase scored during this period could in most cases be
better tolerated by Taiwan's competitors. Given the competitive-
ness of Taiwan's products and the increasing U.S. demand for
imports, the existence of U.S. as well as Japanese firms in
Taiwan, both making exportable goods for the American market,
contributed significantly to Taiwan's expanding share in U.S.
imports.
In the case of Japan, Taiwan's exports to Japan in general
increased after 1966 pari passu with the expansion of Japan's
import demand as a whole (see Figure 6). Taiwan's exports to
Japan did not rise in as extraordinary a manner as did Taiwan's
exports to the United States. Japanese direct investments in
Taiwan probably contributed as much to the increase in Taiwan's
exports to the United States as they did to increase exports from
Taiwan to Japan.
SENSITIVITY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
TO POLITICAL EVENTS
The rate of foreign direct investment in Taiwan was
apparently very sensitive to political events, as is to be expected.
The rate of U.S. investment in Taiwan dropped in 1971 and 1972
probably as a result of the ROC's international setbacks during
those years and doubt about its future status (Figure 7). Between
1972 and 1973 there was a sharp increase in new U.S. investment
in Taiwan, which seemed to reflect some recovery of confidence on
the part of U.S. investors. However, the increase was smaller in
real terms if price increases are discounted. Investments fell again
in 1974 because of the general recession and postponement of'
investment plans by many firms.
The flow of direct investment from Japan, including invest-
ments by "overseas Chinese" residents in Japan, rose steadily
during 1965-70, immediately after the establishment of the export
processing zones (Figure 8). The rate of flow fell in 1972, reflecting
the same concern felt by U.S. investors. Following Japan's
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transfer of diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Peking in 1973,
another decline of new Japanese investment in Taiwan occurred
in 1974 and 1975 although the cause of the decline is again
somewhat ambiguous because it coincided with the recession.'
STRUCTURAL CHANGE OF TAIWAN'S ECONOMY AND
FOREIGN TRADE
As the economy of Taiwan develops further, not only will
there be an increase in GNP and the volume of trade, but the
domestic sector of the economy should expand even faster. Such a
development would reduce the "foreign trade ratio" - defined
here as the ratio of foreign commodity trade to GNP plus imports
- which was as high as 60 percent in 1973. In this connection, the
case of Japan presents an appropriate illustration and compari-
son. During 1908-17 the Japanese "foreign trade ratio" averaged
29 percent." It declined to 20 percent in 1950-54. The Japanese
ratio has always been much smaller than that of contemporary
Taiwan because of the latter's smaller size. To put it in another
way, Japan's very large GNP has dwarfed the tremendous size of
its foreign trade. Because of its smaller size, Taiwan probably will
have for a long time a much higher foreign trade ratio than
Japan. However, Taiwan is clearly fast approaching the point
when it should begin to expand the domestic sector of the
economy by "filling out" the many linkages which its export-
oriented economy has already succeeded in developing. Even
during 1972-74, domestic sales were already accounting for over
40 percent of the sales of enterprises owned by overseas investors
in Taiwan.' 2
In the case of Japan, the ratio of export of goods and services
to GNP remained at a fairly stable level of 10 to 11 percent during
1955-73 - in comparison with about 20 percent in the 1930s -
while per capita GNP grew by leaps and bounds.'" The percentage
10. According to Taiwan statistics, Japanese direct investment approvals,
including applications by "overseas Chinese" residents in Japan, declined 14.4
percent between 1973 and 1974, from $48.9 million in 1973 to $41.9 million in 1974.
Another 37.5 percent drop was registered in 1975. On the other hand, Japan's
overall direct investment to foreign countries declined even more during 1973-74,
from $3.5 billion to $2.4 billion, or 32.5 percent. Japan's Direct Investment
Overseas, Present State and Future Outlook, Keidanren, Tokyo, March 1976.
11. Simon Kuznets, Six Lectures on Economic Growth, Free Press of Glencoe,
Illinois, 1959, p. 103.
12. Private communication.
13. Lawrence B. Krause and Sueo Sekiguchi, "Japan and the World
Economy," in Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky, Eds., Asia's New Giant,
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contribution of export to economic growth from 1921-25 to
1934-38 was estimated at 39 percent as compared to only 17
percent in 1955-71.1 4 The decline of the export to GNP ratio and of
export as a component of growth in the post-World War II period
was accompanied by a dramatic change in the structure of
exports. The proportion of such labor-intensive exports as textiles
and clothing, food, beverage and tobacco, etc. dropped from 65
percent of total exports in 1955 to 43 percent in 1973. Meanwhile,
the share of R and D-intensive (e.g., optical and precision
instruments), capital-intensive, and high-wage exports (e.g.,
automobiles, consumer electronics and so forth) rose sharply. If
the Japanese experience is any useful guide, the continuation of
Taiwan's GNP and export growth will also have to be accompan-
ied by an increase in value-added in export, as well as a reduction
of import content per dollar of export. Rising wage rates and an
increasing share of exports originating from domestic enterprises
as compared to exports by foreign enterprises will make these
changes both necessary and possible.
However, upgrading of the technological content of Taiwan's
products in general, including exports, an increase in the ratio of
skilled to unskilled labor in the labor content of these products,
and a gradual rise in their capital content will take time. Nor can
they occur without the sustained infusion of new technology,
much of which will be embodied in capital equipment. Thus there
will have to be more direct foreign investment, more licensing
arrangements between Taiwan and foreign firms, and more joint
ventures between Taiwan capital and new technology from
abroad. Between 1972 and 1974 exports by Taiwan enterprises
registered a 53.4 percent increase in value; however, the share of
foreign enterprises in total exports increased from 22.3 percent to
29.2 percent. This means, therefore, that foreign businessmen will
have to help in marketing an increasing amount of new exports.
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 1976, p. 399; Edward F. Desnon and
Willing K. Chung, "Economic Growth and Its Sources," in ibid., p. 84. Also,
Economic Statistics of Japan, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, 1961, pp. 4 and 88.
14. N. Baba and M. Tatemoto, "Foreign Trade and Economic Growth in
Japan: 1858-1937," in Lawrence Klein and Kazushi, Eds., Economic Growth: The
Japanese Experience since the Meiji Era, Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, 1968, p. 177;
Denison and Chung, op. cit., p. 79; Krause and Sekiguchi, op. cit., p. 399. The
percentage contribution of exports is measured by dividing the increment in
exports by the increment in GNP, in constant prices.
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Figure 9 shows in a scatter diagram the close correlation (r =
+0.966) between the volume of cumulative direct U.S. investment
and Taiwan's export to the United States. A similar correlation
exists between total direct overseas investment in Taiwan and
Taiwan's total export.
It follows from the above that at this stage of its development
the continuation of direct foreign investment and technological
inflow are indispensable to the economic viability of Taiwan.
Furthermore, the flow of goods, people, capital and technology
must not be impeded or subjected to delay in any way. On the
contrary, they must expand further and be quickly responsive to
changing conditions. Finally, as the volume of Taiwan's exports
increases, further expansion needs to be accompanied by greater
commodity and geographical diversification in order to minimize
the effect of protectionist sentiments in the importing countries.
Thus a primary condition of Taiwan's economic viability is the
maintenance of the freedom of the high seas, the freedom to travel
to and from Taiwan, the freedom to communicate between Taiwan
and the rest of the world, and the ability to enter new markets and
to diversify - including upgrading - into new exports. Taiwan
needs the traditional open-door policy of the United States in
which the door will swing open both ways.
IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE US-ROC RELATIONS ON THE
ECONOMIC VIABILITY OF TAIWAN
How alternative US-ROC relations will affect Taiwan's
economic viability will depend, in the first instance, upon their
effect on the factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
A. Direct Foreign Investment
A statement of the American Chamber of Commerce in the
Republic of China, dated August 25, 1976, raised a number of
questions about the future status of American business in Taiwan
if diplomatic recognition is extended to Peking. Will American
business continue to enjoy national treatment in the hands of the
ROC government? Will there be nationalization? If so, what will
be the level of compensation? Will the various insurance schemes
against inconvertibility and expropriation offered by the U.S.
government and its agencies (e.g., OPIC) continue to be valid?
What will be the proper procedure for resolving questions, or
settling disputes, that may arise in present and future contracts or
in the course of doing business (e.g., in case of oil spills by one
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party's tankers in the territorial waters of the other). Whether
continuation of relations between the two countries as they now
stand will remove the uncertainty that has inspired these
questions is by no means sure. It will depend upon how long the
present status is expected to last. If the present condition is
expected to be transitory, investors will tend either to stay away
or to avoid heavy or long-term commitments. This attitude would
tend to increase Taiwan's dependence on (i) loans, (ii) export
earnings, and (iii) licensing arrangements for the acquisition of
capital goods and foreign technology. Conceivably Taiwan may
then be faced with a higher debt service ratio, and its balance of
payments position may deteriorate, which would in turn affect its
credit standing.
If relations between the two countries are downgraded and
U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking takes place, many of the
questions that inspired uncertainty among American business-
men in Taiwan will become immediately relevant. Even if efforts
are made by either the ROC or the U.S. government to allay fears,
and even if none of the untoward developments mentioned by the
American Chamber of Commerce actually transpires, fear of loss
will not go away entirely. A process of gradual withdrawal by
U.S. business interests may begin. Such a debilitating process can
be avoided only if the governments of both countries can offer
joint assurances, which would seem to require a degree of mutual
trust and good will that may not be consistent with the initial
assumption of the downgrading of their bilateral relations.
Only in the two-China case, which presupposes a reaffirma-
tion of the current de facto situation on a more or less permanent
and de jure basis - that is, at least as far as the United States is
concerned - will the above uncertainties be removed. Long-term
large commitments would then involve no more than the usual
business risks. In view of Taiwan's past economic performance,
these risks would be less than in most other developing countries.
As Taiwan's economic structure changes gradually in the
directions noted earlier, economic vulnerability to external
influence will also diminish. This process of progressive improve-
ment will be in direct contrast to the progressive deterioration of
the previous case.
B. Current Exports and Imports
If US-ROC relations remain as they are, Taiwan's external
trade can continue to expand as long as its products remain
competitive and the world economy - the U.S. and Japanese
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economies in particular - remains reasonably prosperous.
However, even under present conditions, there have been repeated
PRC-inspired efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally. One of the
latest examples was the attempt in 1976 by members of the
INTELSAT to replace the ROC with the PRC in its membership,
which could become a prelude to an attempt to deny the ROC
access to the INTELSAT Indian Ocean satellite for direct
communication with such countries as Spain, the Federal
Republic of Germany, Italy, France, Austria, Switzerland, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Singapore,
Malaysia and Indonesia.
If US-ROC relations are downgraded and the legal status of
Taiwan can be questioned, both private organizations and
governments will be in a position to raise issues that are
disruptive of Taiwan's foreign trade. For instance, would Taiwan
continue to enjoy MFN status in the United States and other
markets? Would Eximbank facilities continue to be available to
private and public ROC firms? Would Taiwan benefit under the
General Preference Scheme of tariff reductions? Would ROC flag
ships and aircraft be able to function in foreign countries without
interference and delay? Would ROC government and private
interests be able to exploit resources in the deep sea and on the
continental shelf under whatever protection international law
normally provides? Would ROC fishing vessels be able to operate
in ever-widening areas as they do now? (One experimental voyage
to the South Polar region for shrimping was completed early this
year.) Can visa applications by ROC businessmen and other
travelers be processed quickly? Would contractual obligations
between ROC and other nationals be enforceable and in what
court? Perhaps some of these questions cannot be answered
without court tests. In other cases, administrative interpretations
of ambiguous regulations and statutes may be necessary. In either
case, delays will be unavoidable. As a matter of fact, delays can be
easily created, which alone may raise the cost of doing business
with Taiwan and by Taiwan businessmen, with the attendant
adverse effect on profit prospects. 15 Such tactics can be adopted by
15. An example of such delay, which borders on deliberate harassment, is the
recent case in San Francisco where the acceptance of a gift from the city of Taipei
to the city of San Francisco in the form of a pavilion to be erected in Golden Gate
Park has been held up by the San Francisco Planning Commission's insistence
that the donors file an environmental impact report to show how the aesthetic
quality of the park would not be adversely affected.
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Taiwan's political detractors. They can also be initiated by
business rivals. Only in the case of the two-China alternative can
the risks noted above be minimized.
C. Taiwan's Economic Response
One of the factors that will affect confidence on the part of
foreign investors and traders who deal with Taiwan is the latter's
response to the uncertainties and challenges posed by US-ROC
relations. For instance, following the unfavorable international
political developments in 1971-72 and partly as a response to
them, the ROC government has further liberalized its rules
governing foreign remittance and travel. Import restrictions have
also been liberalized. Conceivably, a similar response could be
forthcoming if US-ROC political relations are downgraded, or in
spite of such a downgrading. However, a diametrically opposite
response could have been made in the past, and it would be no less
possible in the future. This possibility is greater if a major adverse
economic impact, or the rapid worsening of an initially minor
impact, is envisioned by ROC policy makers. In such an
eventuality, Taiwan may turn inward with the result of stricter
foreign trade and exchange controls, rising defense expenditures
and a slow-down of economic growth and foreign trade. The issue
involves weighing short-run gains against long-run disadvan-
tages. So far Taiwan has kept its economic policies focused on
long-term gains. However, short-run risks could loom too large to
be ignored.
D. Third Country Policies and Responses
of Private Individuals
Threats to curtail the freedom of access between Taiwan and
the rest of the world in terms of communication, travel by air and
sea, freight transportation, national markets, legal redress, and
exploitation of marine and undersea resources are unlikely to
materialize in the near future as a result of the direct physical
intervention of the PRC as long as the latter's capacity to do so is
limited. Implementation of such threats by Peking at this time
will require the cooperation of other governments or private
organizations and individuals that take advantage of Taiwan's
particular international status. While concrete actions can be
instigated by Peking, they can also be initiated by the individual
interests of third parties. Hence the policies of countries other
than the PRC and ROC can play an important role. Will they be
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willing to be a party to the infringement of the freedoms
mentioned above with respect to Taiwan or any other economic
entity regardless of the latter's de jure international political
status? Will they permit their own citizens to engage in
discriminatory practices that aim at the economic isolation of
Taiwan? U.S. policy and leadership in this regard are of vital
importance and can affect the attitudes of other countries. The
following examples in 1976 will serve as illustrations.
1. A message was delivered to the president of the National
Council for US-China Trade by a member of the PRC Liaison
Office in Washington in May 1976 to the effect that U.S. firms
might find their trade with the PRC adversely affected by their
membership in a recently formed US-ROC Economic Council. The
message ostensibly originated from the China Council for the
Promotion of International Trade in Peking and was duly passed
on by the president of the National Council to the latter's
members in a memorandum for their attention, dated May 11,
1976.
2. According to a Los Angeles Times report on September 8,
1976, several U.S. firms had been targets of PRC discrimination in
their trade probes because of their attempts to do business with
both Taiwan and the Mainland. This point was made amply clear
to them by the PRC. A less clear case was reported by the Wall
Street Journal on September 14, 1976, concerning the refusal of
Mainland China banks to cash American Express travellers
checks for visitors, presumably because of the company's
relationship with the ROC.
A directive by President Ford to the then Secretary of
Commerce, officially released by the White House on October 7,
1976, during the heat of the presidential campaign, reaffirmed our
national policy of opposition to boycott actions against "nations
friendly to us" and made Arab boycott request reports filed by
U.S. companies with the Department of Commerce available to
the public. The kind of implied request by Peking that U.S. firms
intending to sell to the PRC not engage in various relationships
with the ROC would seem to fall under the purview of U.S. Export
Administration Regulations paragraph 369.2 and paragraph 369.3
requiring reporting within 15 calendar days of receipt of the
request. A California law (A.B. No. 3080) has specifically made it
unlawful to exclude persons or corporations from business
transactions on the basis that the party conducts or has
conducted business in a particular location or on the basis of sex,
race, creed, color, etc. On the national level several anti-boycott
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
bills with provisions of economic penalties for offenders are now
in the Congress. It remains to be seen whether the same principles
would in fact apply to discriminatory measures practiced by the
PRC aimed at US-Taiwan economic relations.
POSSIBLE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE POLICIES ON
U. S. ECONOMIC INTERESTS
The foregoing discussion attempts to identify the economic
consequences of alternative U.S. policies for Taiwan. From the
standpoint of the United States the relative desirability of the
three alternatives depends on which of them would on balance
further U.S. objectives the most. What are the fundamental U.S.
economic interests in the present context? In the short run, one
might include stable and expanding markets for U.S. exports and
sources of supply of U.S. imports and protection of existing U.S.
investments abroad. The major long-run U.S. international
economic objectives are economic security of the countries
concerned, expansion of world trade and economic growth of per
capita income in the developing countries, and safeguarding of
new investment opportunities for American investors. The relative
weights assigned to these objectives vary somewhat with the
decision-maker's perceptions, their relation with other noneco-
nomic objectives, and the specific circumstances in which the
choices present themselves. There are, therefore, always some
uncertainies regarding the relative importance of different U.S.
objectives at any given time. By and large, however, these do
represent the basic U.S. economic interests.
US-PRC VERSUS US-ROC TRADE
Since 1971 the United States has been trading with the PRC
and Taiwan at the same time. A no-change policy or a two-China
policy would probably have little short-run effect on US-ROC
trade prospects but might increase U.S. direct investment in
Taiwan. The PRC could be antagonized by such stands and divert
its U.S. trade to elsewhere, other things being equal, if shifts are
possible. Downgrading of US-ROC relations, together with
diplomatic recognition of Peking, may also create a similar but
reverse situation in which the United States may lose in its trade
with Taiwan and gain in its trade with the PRC. To provide some
background information for discussion of the possible tradeoffs,
Figure 10 compares U.S. exports to, and imports from, the PRC
and Taiwan in 1971-76. The comparison shows two distinctive
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS
1975 19761971 1972 1973 1974
Figure 10
C~ornparison of U.S. Exports to, and Imports from,the ROC and the P 1971-1976
1 M fl 16CCf 41i I
3.000
2.600
2.400 R
2,200 M
2,000 Nuim 19
1.800
#110141
.600
1400 o
1.200
1,000
8Co
USexor
MEMO
..... . .......
4
THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW JOURNAL
features. First, US-ROC and US-PRC trade are of very different
orders of magnitude. Two-way US-ROC trade in 1975 was $3,602
million, almost eight times the US-PRC trade of $462 million. In
1976, the respective totals were $337.3 million for US-PRC trade
and $4,527.3 million for US-ROC trade, or 13 times larger. The
enormous difference suggests that Taiwan is at present a far more
important market for U.S. exports and source of supply of U.S.
imports than the PRC. A 10 percent loss of trade with Taiwan
would have to be compensated by a 130 percent increase in US-
PRC trade. On the other hand, a total loss of US-PRC trade could
be made up with a 7.4 percent increase in US-ROC trade. Second,
U.S. exports to the PRC were more erratic than U.S. exports to
Taiwan. For instance, there was a sharp drop in U.S. exports to
the PRC in 1974-75. In part this was a result of overcommitment
by Peking in the early 1970s. In part it was due to a shift of its
grain purchase to suppliers. In any event, Peking makes no secret
of its position that trade is a legitimate economic tool to be used to
enhance its diplomatic and political leverage, as has been made
abundantly clear in Teng Hsia-ping's speech before the United
Nations General Assembly on April 10, 1974. Therefore, in
expanding exports to the PRC, one must be prepared to face the
constant risk of abrupt shifts.
At any rate, a sustained increase in US-PRC trade cannot be
based on a shift of PRC trade from other partners to the United
States, but rather on growth of the PRC's total trade. The crucial
question is, therefore, the trade potential of the PRC. Since
Peking's imports depend on its exports, trade potential, in the long
run, means essentially export potential. In the two decades up to
1970, PRC exports grew at the rate of two to three hundred million
dollars a year, a small amount compared to Taiwan's current
level. When the PRC began to export oil in significant quantities
in 1973, it was widely believed that this new export would provide
the key to an upsurge of exports. There was indeed an upsurge
during 1970-75, but it was due largely to price increases during
this period. More important, it is questionable whether the PRC's
oil exports could indeed play a leading role; they have not lived up
to expectations thus far. Whether their growth has been restricted
by internal supply or demand conditions, or by the leadership's
change of plans, is not entirely clear. However, one external factor
is significant in limiting the contribution of the PRC's oil exports
to its foreign exchange earning power. Peking began exporting oil
at a time when the oil crisis triggered world-wide inflation and
recession. As a result, the prices of the PRC's imports rose much
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faster than those of its traditional exports (i.e., exports other than
oil). That is to say, the terms of trade became adverse to the PRC
so far as traditional exports were concerned. This was offset by
the rise in price of its oil exports. The net effect is that the increase
in export capacity in real terms was rather limited. In addition,
two recent events would probably delay export growth somewhat.
These were the Tangshan earthquake, which inflicted heavy
damage on a major coal production center, and the need for
foreign exchange to pay for the large number of plants contracted
earlier.
PRC earnings from exports to the U.S. can increase if Peking
is granted MFN status, which would enable suppliers of these
products to promote them more vigorously even if their dollar
prices were to remain unchanged. Greater sales are possible, of
course, if prices are reduced somewhat although lower prices are
by no means contingent upon MFN status since there is no direct
relationship between external prices and Chinese domestic cost.
When we compare the types of U.S. imports from the PRC and
Taiwan, as shown in Table 2, one interesting feature emerges.
What the United States buys most from Taiwan it buys very little
from the PRC, and vice versa. This suggests that Taiwan and the
PRC supplement each other as sources of U.S. imports. The PRC
provided mostly crude materials, food, chemicals and some
manufactured goods. Taiwan supplied large amounts of machin-
ery and transportation equipment and manufactured goods. The
implication of this complementarity for the United States is that it
would be difficult to replace one source of supply with the other.
To make up for the loss of a supplier, it might be possible to
restructure the other's exports or to turn to a third source. But
restructuring exports is not a simple task and the question
remains as to whether the country's comparative advantage
would justify such a drastic change economically. As for the
possibility of a third supplier, the alternative is certainly feasible.
To a degree, South Korea or Hong Kong could partially take the
place of Taiwan. But again, there is the question of the terms of
trade. When there is less competition among the suppliers, the
terms of trade generally work against the buyer. This brings us to
the problem of the PRC and Taiwan as alternative markets for
U.S. exports.
Table 3 shows U.S. exports to the PRC and Taiwan by
commodity groups in 1971-76. The picture here is quite different
from U.S. imports. Both the PRC and Taiwan buy more or less the
same group of U.S. products. Both are competing for U.S. exports.
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Table 2.
U.S. Imports from Taiwan and PRC, 1971-76 (Million U.S. $)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Total imports
Taiwan
PRC
Food, live animals
Taiwan
PRC
Beverages, tobacco
Taiwan
PRC
Crude materials, inedible
(except fuel)
Taiwan
PRC
Mineral fuels,
lubricants, etc.
Taiwan
PRC
Oils & fats, animal,
vegetable
Taiwan
PRC
Chemicals
Taiwan
PRC
Manufactured goods
Taiwan
PRC
Machinery, transportation
equipment
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous manufac-
tured articles
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous
Taiwan
PRC
817.4 1,293.5 1,772.5 2,107.6
4.9 32.3 64.0 114.7
1,946.0 2,958.4
158.3 201.9
54.2 84.1 85.3 111.9 192.4 142.0
1.5 4.2 6.0 13.5 14.2 23.8
- - 0.3 0.4
0.7 2.8
- 0.09
1.8 0.3
7.0 11.7 15.0 14.1 11.1 13.9
2.2 12.3 14.6 16.3 17.6 38.5
- 0.4 2.1 0.4 3.4 0.01
- - 0.4 0.1 - neg.
- - 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3
- - 0.7 0.4 1.9 2.4
6.9 9.5 12.1 31.9 16.2 26.1
0.3 2.1 8.2 18.4 15.9 18.0
119.4 193.2 242.2 288.0 238.0 355.4
0.5 7.4 21.0 42.7 79.4 68.5
202.2 401.1 600.5 685.3
- 0.1 0.4 0.1
488.5 780.2
0.3 1.3
420.1 584.0 797.6 954.7 964.5 1,618.0
0.3 6.1 11.2 19.2 25.6 47.5
7.5 9.4
- 0.1
17.1 20.8 31.4 22.4
0.8 1.2 1.6 1.6
Sources: 1971: U.S. Department of Commerce, General Imports, World Area by
Commodity Groups, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972, pp. 374.
1972-75: Far Eastern Economic Review (Hong Kong), July 2, 1976, p. 44.
U.S. Dept. Commerce, Bureau of East-West Trade, Office of East-West Policy,
U.S. Trade Status with Communist Countries, February 1977.
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Table 3.
U.S. Exports to Taiwan and PRC, 1971-76 (Million U.S. $)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Total exports
Taiwan
PRC
Food and live animals
Taiwan
PRC
Beverages and tobacco
Taiwan
PRC
Crude materials, inedible
(except fuel)
Taiwan
PRC
Mineral fuels,
lubricants, etc.
Taiwan
PRC
Oils & fats, animal,
vegetable
Taiwan
PRC
Chemicals
Taiwan
PRC
Manufactured goods
Taiwan
PRC
Machinery, transporta-
tion equipment
Taiwan
PRC
Miscellaneous manufac-
tured articles
Taiwan
PRC
Items not classified
by kind
Taiwan
PRC
342.7 629.5 1,165.0 1,423.8 1,655.7 1,568.9
- 60.2 689.1 806.9 303.6 135.4
30.5 55.9 154.1 167.8 180.9 202.1
- 56.0 410.1 329.6 0.02 -
10.1 14.9 18.7 30.8 27.5 13.2
- - 1.4 2.7 - neg.
141.6 149.1 319.1 307.3 407.5 304.5
- - 171.9 328.0 100.1 13.0
2.1 2.6 3.5 7.2
- - - 0.2
7.2 0.01
0.2 0.1
4.4 4.3 5.2 18.4 10.0 12.2
- 2.2 19.2 7.5 - -
25.2 32.4 90.0 127.4 125.3 154.6
- - 7.9 10.2 5.2 10.4
25.3 31.4 76.2 123.4 141.3 132.2
- - 9.0 18.5 73.8 43.3
157.5 233.4 398.2 562.7 599.7 666.2
- 2.0 69.0 106.7 118.8 65.1
13.1 20.5 21.2 32.4 39.2 69.5
- 1.1 0.8 2.7 4.9 3.4
1.8 2.5 5.9 6.7 6.2 3.4
- - - 0.3 0.4 0.02
See Sources, Table 2 supra.
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It would be to the advantage of the United States to have two
buyers rather than one. On this account, the two-China case is
perhaps preferable to others simply because it offers the U.S. more
options so far as export markets are concerned.
LONG-RANGE U.S. INTERESTS: INTERNATIONAL
STABILITY AND GROWTH
The oil crisis has brought into sharp focus the need to insure
economic security for all countries in an international environ-
ment characterized by growing interdependence through trade,
flow of technology and investment. It is a declaratory policy of the
United States to pursue this goal. 16 Any abrupt move by the
United States that causes serious disruption and tension in
international economic relations is therefore contrary to U.S.
interests and to what it has been preaching to the OPEC
countries. By this criterion the no-change policy would obviously
be less disruptive than the other alternatives, particularly in the
short-run. As we have noted above, diplomatic recognition of
Peking and withdrawal of recognition of the ROC would probably
generate an economic shock in Taiwan with adverse effects on its
growth rate and perhaps even its viability.
In its struggle for economic survival, Taiwan may resort to
rather drastic measures such as devaluation to offset a possible
export decline, and stricter control of the free flow of goods,
people, information and capital - a series of measures that
probably would not hurt the U.S. economy seriously but nonethe-
less could have destabilizing effects in the region. The two-China
policy might also generate a shock, but it is likely to be a political
rather than economic shock, and would have its main impact on
the PRC. If we look beyond the immediate future, the potential
disputes over resources on the continental shelf could be further
complicated by an additional claimant. But the emergence of
Taiwan as an independent state has positive elements. The
current trend toward expanding trade and international flows of
technology and investment might continue as risks and uncertain-
ties subside. They may even accelerate in the event of diplomatic
recognition of the PRC and Taiwan at the same time.
If indeed the latter occurs, a two-China policy would help to
attain the long-range U.S. objective of assisting the developing
16. Address by Henry A. Kissinger, delivered by Daniel P. Moynihan, at the
Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 1,
1975.
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countries to raise their living standards. A no-change policy would
probably have neutral effects, if we accept the premise that
Peking could expand its trade and technology transfer as much as
it can under the present arrangement. By contrast, diplomatic
recognition of Peking is likely to bring about economic stagnation
if not a decline in the Taiwan economy.
For Japan, U.S. diplomatic recognition of Peking has yet
another unfavorable effect. Like Taiwan, Japan depends heavily
on the free flow of raw materials and fuels. It is therefore
important that no precedent be establised so that shipping and
trade involving Japan would be disrupted. Since diplomatic
recognition might lead to economic warfare and possibly military
confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC, it would be in
Japan's economic interest that the United States adopt another
alternative.
Dr. Sigur thanked Dr. Wu for giving us quite a bit to think
about and discuss in the coming hour and a half or so. He was
particularly grateful that Dr. Wu brought in the Japanese
dimension, because he thought as we discussed the whole question
of US-ROC relations and involvement with the PRC, we had to
keep in mind that successive presidents of the U.S. over the past
several years as well as the present incumbent, Mr. Carter, had
stated over and over again that the fundamental American
relationship in the Asian Pacific is the U.S.-Japanese alliance.
Therefore we must understand how important this was in any
discussion that we had on events in Asia.
Dr. Sigur then introduced Dr. Robert Heuser of the Max
Planck-Institute at Heidelberg to speak. He said that he need
not tell the participants very much about that institute since all of
us knew of that famous institute. Dr. Heuser was going to speak
on the legal aspects of trade with, and investment in the Republic
of China in the experience of the German Federal Republic (FRG).
Dr. Heuser sketched the history of FRG-ROC trade relations
up to 1976, when Germany was the ROC's third-ranked trade
partner, following the United States and Japan. He noted also the
growth of German capital investment in the ROC, especially in
the last few years. Lack of diplomatic relations between the two
countries, according to Dr. Heuser, is not a substantial impedi-
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ment to trade. Government investment guarantees are available
to the German investor in spite of the lack of an FRG-ROC
"investment protection agreement"; however, because of the short-
term nature of most German investment in the ROC and because
of, among other things, the ROC's internal investment protection
scheme, German investors rarely take advantage of these
guarantees. Dr. Heuser also noted that protection with regard to
trademarks and patents is available, but that protection against
infringement of copyrighted textile designs remains unsatisfac-
tory. Dr. Heuser concluded by discussing the effects of the EEC
common commercial policy on FRG-ROC economic relations. To
date, the common commercial policy has only affected German
textile imports from the ROC. However, the effects of protective
measures undertaken by the EEC remain an important matter of
concern.
[The following is the text of the paper prepared by Dr. Robert
Heuser.]
